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Abstract
We study how risk-sensitive players act in situations where the out-
come is influenced not only by the state-action profile but also by the
distribution of it. In such interactive decision-making problems, the clas-
sical mean-field game framework does not apply. We depart from most of
the mean-field games literature by presuming that a decision-maker may
include its own-state distribution in its decision. This leads to the class
of mean-field-type games. In mean-field-type situations, a single decision-
maker may have a big impact on the mean-field terms for which new type
of optimality equations are derived. We establish a finite dimensional
stochastic maximum principle for mean-field-type games where the drift
functions have a p-norm structure which weaken the classical Lipschitz
and differentiability assumptions. Sufficient optimality equations are es-
tablished via Dynamic Programming Principle but in infinite dimension.
Using de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage theorem, we show that a propagation of
chaos property with virtual particles holds for the non-linear McKean-
Vlasov dynami1cs.
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in optimization and game problems
of mean-field type, where the performance functionals, drifts, diffusions, and
jump coefficients depend not only on the state and the control but also on the
probability distribution of state-control pair. Most formulations of mean-field
type optimization in [5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 27] have been of risk-neutral type where the
performance functionals are the expected values of stage-additive cost functions
of Bolza or Mayer type. Not all behavior, however, can be captured by risk-
neutral mean-field type optimizations. One way of capturing risk-averse and
risk-seeking behaviors is by exponentiating the performance functional before
expectation (see [14]). The objective of a risk-sensitive player is then to optimize
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an exponentiated long-term loss. The risk-sensitive criterion is related to the
robust control via relative entropic measures. As the risk-sensitive parameters
vanish, one gets a risk-neutral maximum principle of mean-field-type.
1.1 On Mean-Field Games
There are several pioneer works on static and/or stationary mean-field games.
Most of them are under different names such as global games, anonymous games,
aggregative games, population games, large games, etc, but share lot of com-
mon features. Here we limit ourselves to the some pioneer works on dynamic
mean-field games. One of the first works on mean-field games is [1]. Therein,
the author proposes a game-theoretic model that explains why smaller firms
grow faster and are more likely to fail than larger firms in large economies. The
game is played over a discrete time space. The mean-field is the aggregate de-
mand/supply which generates a price dynamics. The price moves forwardly, and
the players react to the price and generate a demand and the firm a supply with
associated cost, which regenerates the next price and so on. The author intro-
duced a system of backward-forward system to find equilibria (see for example
Section 4, equation D.1 and D.2 in [1]). The backward equilibrium equation
is obtained as an optimality to the individual response, i.e., the value function
associated with the best response to price, and the forward equation for the
evolution of price. Therein, the consistency check is about the mean-field of
equilibrium actions (population or mass of actions), that is, the equilibrium
price solves a fixed-point system: the price regenerated after the reaction of
the players through their individual best-responses should be consistent with
the price they responded to. Following that analogy, a more general frame-
work was developed in [2], where the mean-field equilibrium is introduced in
the content of Markovian dynamic games with large number of decision-makers.
A mean-field equilibrium is defined in page 4 of [2] by two conditions: (i) each
generic player’s action is best-response to the mean-field, and (ii) the mean-field
is consistent and is exactly reproduced from the reactions of the players. This
matching argument was widely used in the literature as it can be interpreted as
a generic player reacting to an evolving mean-field object and at the same time
the mean-field is formed from the contributions of all the players. The authors
of [39] show that show how common noise can be introduced into the mean-field
game model (so the mean-field distribution evolves stochastically) and extend
the Jovanovic-Rosenthal existence theorem. The methodology developed in [1]
and the subsequent series of papers [2, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44] share the following
assumptions:
• (Big size) There is a large number of decision-makers, sometimes, infinite,
or a continuum of decision-makers.
• (Anonymity) The index of the decision-maker does not affect the utility.
• (NonAtomicity) A single decision-maker has a negligible effect on the
mean-field-term and on the utility.
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Unfortunately, some of the above conditions appear to be very restrictive in
terms of applications, and we explain below how to relax them via mean-field-
type game theory.
1.2 Related works on Mean-Field-Type Game Theory
One decision-maker
A stochastic maximum principle (SMP) for the risk-sensitive optimal control
problems for Markov diffusion processes with an exponential-of-integral perfor-
mance functional was elegantly derived in [17] using the relationship between
the SMP and the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) which expresses the
first order adjoint process as the gradient of the value-function of the under-
lying control problem. This relationship holds only when the value-function is
smooth (see Assumption (B4) in [17]). The approach of [17] was widely used
and extended to jump processes in [19] and [20, 18], but still under this smooth-
ness assumption. However, in many cases of interest, the value function is, in
the best case, only continuous. Moreover, the relationship between the SMP
and the DPP is unclear for non-Markovian dynamics and for mean-field type
game problems where the Bellman optimality principle need to be extended.
This calls for the need to find a risk-sensitive SMP and DPP for these cases.
Djehiche et al. (2014, [22, 4]) have established a stochastic maximum principle
for risk-sensitive mean-field-type control where the key mean-field term is the
mean state. This means that the drift, diffusion, running cost and terminal cost
functions depend on the state, the control and on the mean of state. Our work
extends the results of [17] to risk-sensitive control problems for dynamics that
are non-Markovian and of mean-field type. One important contribution of [22]
is that the derivation of the SMP does not require any (explicit) relationship
between the first-order adjoint process and a value-function of an underlying
control problem. Using the SMP derived in [13], the approach is easily ex-
tended to the case where the mean-field coupling is in terms of the mean of
the state and the control processes. In [45], we have extended the methodol-
ogy to risk-sensitive mean-field-type control under partial observation which has
interesting applications in risk-sensitive filtering problems including mean-field
ensemble Kalman filtering, state tracking and other data assimilation algorithms
in geosciences.
Two or more decision-makers
The first paper that deals with risk-sensitive games in a mean-field context is
[21]. Therein, we have derived a verification theorem for a risk-sensitive mean-
field game whose underlying dynamics is a Markov diffusion, using a matching
argument between a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations and
the Fokker-Planck equation. This matching argument freezes the mean-field
coupling in the dynamics, which yields a risk-sensitive HJB equation for the
value-function. The mean-field coupling is then retrieved through the Fokker-
Planck equation satisfied by the marginal law of the optimal state. The work in
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[21] is fundamentally different than the present work. Therein, the mean-field
term is frozen to be the equilibrium mean-field term and a single decision-maker
cannot influence the mean-field-term. In the present work, we shall show that,
when a single decision-maker has a non-negligible effect in the mean-field, the
fundamental optimality equations are changed. In [24] we have analyzed risk-
sensitive linear-exponentiated quadratic games of mean-field-type for which we
have provided closed-form expressions using a novel risk-sensitive stochastic
maximum principle derived in [22] which does not use the value function. It
allows us, in particular, to work with the SMP equations in situations where
the value function is not necessarily differentiable.
Substantial progress have been done in the last decade in mean-field games
in the non-cooperative setup. However, very little is known about cooperative
mean-field games. In [36] we have introduced cooperative mean-field type games
in which the state dynamics and the payoffs depend not only on the state and
actions but also on their probability measure. We establish a time-dependent
payoff allocation procedure for coalitions of mean-field type. The allocated pay-
off considers not only fairness property but also the cost of making the coalition.
Both time consistency and subgame perfectness solution concept equations are
established.
1.3 Mean-field-type games: additional features
Risk-sensitive mean-field-type games [42] are fundamentally different than risk-
sensitive mean-field games. In the mean-field game-theoretic models it is usually
assumed that (i) very large number of players, (ii) players are indistinguishability
(in the sense of the strategies, payoffs, state laws), (iii) individual contribution
to the mean-field term is assumed to be negligible. In mean-field-type games,
none of the assumptions (i)-(iii) is needed. Following [36], a mean-field-type
game is defined as any game in which the payoff and/or state dynamics involve
not only the state and action profiles and also the distribution of the sate-action
pair (or its marginals such as distribution of states and distribution of actions).
Mean-field-type game theory is suitable for one, two or more players. A typical
example is, a single decision-maker with mean-variance payoff. In mean-field-
type games: (i) a single player can have a big influence on the mean-field term. A
typical example is an Air Conditioning system which tries to reduce the variance
of the temperature state with the respect the desired comfort temperature of the
user. That the context, there is only one decision-maker, the user, who acts on
the controller. The control variable is between {Heating, Cooling,Nothing}.
Clearly, the control action has significant impact on the variance of the temper-
ature. (ii) there is no need for players to be indistinguishable (see Section 3).
(iii) there is no need to have large number (or infinite or continuum) of players.
The mean-field-type game framework allows us to address more interesting real-
world applications where the number of decision-makers may be large but still
finite and include both von Neumann and non-von Neumann utility functions.
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1.4 Novelty and Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. We start with one player risk-
sensitive mean-field-type optimization where the state dynamics has Lp−norm
structure, which is not differentiable. Our main motivation for considering this
structure comes from its applications for the control of virus spread among in-
teractive communities (networks) as observed in [25]. This allows us to consider
other types of non-linear mean-field interactions that are not investigated in
the literature of mean-field games. It also allow us to consider weakened Lips-
chitz conditions and non-differentiable drift coefficients. We show that the non-
differentiability issue can be handled using weak derivatives or sub-differential
set. We derive a stochastic maximum principle and a dual game variable which
satisfies the risk-sensitive SMP whenever the associates weak derivatives make
sense. In addition, a risk-sensitive DPP is provided in infinite dimension. We
believe that the present paper is the first work that analyzes risk-sensitive mean-
field-type games with the Lp−norm which is non-differentiable.
1.5 Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and state
the main results for one player. Section 3 presents risk-sensitive mean-field type
games with two or more players. We provide a dynamic programming principle
in infinite dimension in subSection 3.2. Section 4 focuses on the control of
virus spread among interactive communities (networks). Section 5 concludes
the paper. For completeness, we provide in Appendix the de Finetti-Hewitt-
Savage theorem and the existence and uniqueness proofs.
To streamline the presentation, we only consider the one-dimensional state
case. The extension to the multidimensional case is by now straightforward. The
norm is denoted with the index α ≥ 1 and p will be used for the adjoint process
in the stochastic maximum principle. Also, it should be noted that our diffusion
coefficient is control independent. More general state, control and mean-field
dependent diffusions are carried out in [22]. Also the technique developed here
can be easily extended to the jump-diffusion case using the works in [10, 12, 11].
2 Mean-field-type game with one risk-sensitive
decision-maker
Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon, α ≥ 1 and (Ω,F , lF, lP) be a given filtered
probability space on which a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion B =
{Bs}s≥0 is given, and the filtration lF = {Fs, 0 ≤ s ≤ T } is the natural filtration
of B augmented by lP−null sets of F . We consider the following risk-sensitive
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problem :

J¯θ(u(·))
= 1θ log
(
Eeθ[
∫
T
0
f(t,xu(t),mu(t),u(t)) dt+h(xu(T ),mu(T ))]
)
,
infu J¯
θ(u)
subject to
dxu(t) = b¯(., t, xu(t),mu(t), u(t)) dt+ σ(., t, xu(t))dB(t),
xu(0) = x0, m
u(t) := L(xu(t)),
(1)
where the state space is X = R, the term b¯ is distribution-dependent and has
the special structure
b¯ =
(∫
y∈X
|b|α(., t, xu(t), y, u(t))mu(t, dy)
) 1
α
,
i.e., the Lα−norm of b with the respect to the measure mu(t, .).
b¯(t, x,m, u) : [0, T ]×X × P(X )× U −→ lR,
t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ lR, m ∈ P(X ), u ∈ U. Notice that for α > 1 the drift term b¯ is
non-linear in the measure m.
b(., t, x, y, u) : [0, T ]×X 2 × U −→ lR,
σ(., t, x) : [0, T ]×X −→ lR,
mu(t) := L(xu(t)) := Pxu(t) is the probability law of the random variable xu(t).
The parameter θ is the risk-sensitivity index of the player. The instantaneous
cost function is
f(t, x,m, u) : [0, T ]×X × P(X )× U −→ lR,
and the terminal cost function is
h(x,m) : X × P(X ) −→ lR.
The control strategy u is chosen by the decision-maker. An admissible control
strategy u is an lF-adapted and Lα
∗
-integrable process with values in a non-
empty subset U of lRd. We denote the set of all admissible strategies of the
player by U .
Definition 1. A mean-field-type game is a game in which the payoff and/or
state dynamics involve not only the state-action profiles and also the distribu-
tion of the sate-action pair (or its marginals such as distribution of states and
distribution of actions).
Example 1. Problem (1) is a mean-field-type game with one decision-maker.
The optimality equation of (1) is a nonstandard system from mean-field-type
optimal control [28].
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Given an admissible strategy u ∈ U of the decision-maker (player), the state
equation in (1) is a measure-dependent stochastic differential equation (SDE)
with random coefficients.
In view of (1), up to a change of the parameter θ into −θ, the optimization
of J¯θ is the same as the following optimization problem
Jθ(u(·)) = Eeθ[
∫
T
0
f(t,xu(t),mu(t),u(t)) dt+h(xu(T ),mu(T ))], (2)
Any u¯(·) ∈ U satisfying
Jθ(u¯(·)) = inf
u(·)∈U
Jθ(u(·)), (3)
is called a risk-sensitive optimal strategy. The corresponding state process, so-
lution of the SDE in (1), is denoted by x¯(·) := xu¯(·). The mean-field-type opti-
mization problem that we are interested in, is to characterize the pair (x¯, u¯) solu-
tion of the problem (1). Let ΨT =
∫ T
0
f(t, x(t),mu(t), u(t))dt+h(x(T ),mu(T )).
Then the risk sensitive loss functional is given by
J¯θ =
1
θ
log Jθ =
1
θ
log
[
EeθΨT
]
.
When the risk-sensitive index θ is small, the loss functional J¯θ can be expanded
as
E[ΨT ] +
θ
2
var(ΨT ) +O(θ
2),
where, var(ΨT ) denotes the variance of ΨT . If θ < 0 , the variance of ΨT , as a
measure of risk, improves the performance, in which case the optimizer is called
risk seeker. But, when θ > 0, the variance of ΨT worsens the performance J¯θ, in
which case the optimizer is called risk averse. The risk-neutral loss functional
E[ΨT ] can be seen as a limit of risk-sensitive functional J¯θ when θ → 0. This is
one of the reasons why this criterion attracted lots of attention. The criterion
has also interesting connections with H∞−mean-field-type optimization. This
is easily viewed from the Donsker-Varadhan formula:
1
θ
log
(∫
eθφ dν
)
= sup
µ∈P(Ω)
[∫
φ dµ− 1
θ
H˜(µ| ν)
]
, (4)
for any measurable bounded function φ on Ω, and ν a probability measure on
Ω. Moreover, the supremum is uniquely achieved by the imitative Boltzmann-
Gibbs distribution µ∗ widely used in distributed strategic learning [26],
dµ∗ =
eθφ dν∫
Ω e
θφ dν
.
The function H˜(.|.) is the relative entropy from Ω to R¯ given by
H˜(µ|ν) :=
∫
log
(
dµ
dν
)
dµ =
∫
dµ
dν
log
(
dµ
dν
)
dν,
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whenever µ ∈ P(Ω) is absolutely continuous with the respect to ν, otherwise we
set H˜(µ|ν) = +∞. The problem is
inf
u
J¯θ(u) = inf
u
sup
µ∈P(Ω)
[
Eµ[ΨT ]− 1
θ
H˜(µ| P)
]
, (5)
2.1 Existence of solution to the state equation
We now focus on the well-posedness of the state dynamics.
Proposition 1. If the functions b and σ are Lipschitz with the respect to (x, y)
with Lipschitz constant L > 0 and
∫ T
0
(∫
y
|b(t, 0, y, u)|αm(t, dy)
)1/α
dt < +∞,
and then, the SDE in (1) admits a unique strong solution xu in Lα. If in addi-
tion, ∫ T
0
(∫
y
|b(t,X, y, u)|2αm(t, dy)
)
dt < +∞,
a.s. then ∀ α ≥ 2,
sup
n
√
n {E
(
sup
t≤T
|xi,n(t)− x¯i,n(t)|α
)
} 1α < +∞,
where xi,n(t) a i−th particle state solution of

dxui,n(t) =
(
1
n
∑n
j=1 |b(., t, xui,n(t), xuj,n(t), u(t))|α
) 1
α
dt
+σ(., t, xui,n(t))dBi,n(t),
L(xui,n(0)) = m0,
(6)
and x¯i,n(t) has the law of x
u(t).
Proof. See Appendix.
As we provide in Theorem 1 in Appendix, the mean-field convergence of
the empirical measure 1n
∑n
i=1 δxui,n(t) is by now a well-established result under
de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage theorem. The issue here is to identify the limiting
measure m with the particularity of the Lα−norm structure. We provide an
example of mean-field-type SDE in cooperative dynamics.
Example 2 (Effect of mean-field in cooperative dynamics). Consider the mean-
field stochastic dynamics with drift
{∫
‖ sin(−x3(t) + x(t)) − µ sin(x(t) − y)‖αm(t, dy)
}1/α
,
8
where µ > 0, and constant diffusion coefficient σ ∈ R. The first term in the drift
(sin(−x3(t) + x(t))) is often replaced by a control action u(t) ∈ [−1, 1] to get
dx(t) = σdB(t) +{∫
‖u(t)− µ sin(x(t) − y)‖αm(t, dy)
}1/α
dt (7)
This type of mean-field SDE models has been used to understand muscle con-
traction (see Section 5 in [23]). Other similar models have been widely studied
in chemical kinetics, statistical mechanics and economics to capture cooperative
behavior of a generic particle, oscillator or an agent.
Note that the presence of the measures mu(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T , in the loss
function Jθ may cause time-inconsistency, in which case the Bellman’s Principle
with the state x is no longer valid and this motivates the use of the stochastic
maximum principle (SMP) approach to a get a finite dimensional framework.
Note, however that, one can apply DPP where the state in infinite dimension
µ(t, .) as shown in Section 3.2 (see also [37]).
2.2 Stochastic Maximum Principle
We define the risk-neutral Hamiltonian associated with random variables X ∈
Lα(Ω,F , lP) as follows. for (p, q) ∈ lR× lR
H(t,X,m, u, p, q) := (8)
b¯(t,X,m, u)p+ σ(t,X)(t,X)q − f(t,X,m, u).
We also introduce the risk-sensitive Hamiltonian: for θ ∈ lR and (p, q, ℓ) ∈
lR× lR× lR,
Hθ(t,X,m, u, p, q, ℓ) := b¯p+ σ(q + θℓp)− f. (9)
We have H = H0. The sign (−f) is used here for the only purpose of having
maximum principle instead of minimum principle and does not fundamentally
change the methodology. Moreover, we denote
Hθk(t) := p(t)b¯k(t) + (q + θℓp)σk(t)− fk(t), (10)
for k ∈ {x,m}.
Note that even if b is differentiable, the drift coefficient b¯ which is
(∫
y∈X
bα(., t, xu(t), y, u(t))mu(t, dy)
) 1
α
,
may not be differentiable at the points where b(.) = 0. Denote by
b¯x(t) =
∫
y∈X
bxb
α−1(., t, xu(t), y, u(t))mu(t, dy)
b¯α−1
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if b¯α−1(x,m) > 0. The case where b¯α−1(x,m) < 0 is handled in a similar way.
The differentiation with the respect to the measurem is considered in a Gateaux-
derivative sense as in [28].
lim
ǫ→0+
d
dǫ
b¯(., t, x,m+ ǫd) =
∫
b¯m(., t, x,m)(ξ) d(dξ).
Example 3. We provide Gateaux differentiation of ‖x‖α−based functions:
• Mean state: Let f(., t, x,m) = ∫ ym(t, dy). Then,
lim
ǫ→0+
d
dǫ
f(., t, x,m+ ǫd) =
∫
ξ d(dξ).
The Gateaux-derivative with the respect to m is fm(., t, x,m)(ξ) = ξ. Then
fm(., t, ξ,m)(x) = x, ∂x[fm(., t, ξ,m)(x)] = 1. It is therefore clear that
∂x[fm(., t, ξ,m)(x)] = 1 6= 0 = ∂m[fx].
• Square of the mean:
Let g(., t, x,m) = 12 (
∫
ym(t, dy))2. Then,
lim
ǫ→0+
d
dǫ
g(., t, x,m+ ǫd) = m¯
∫
ξ d(dξ).
gm(., t, x,m)(ξ) = ξm¯. Hence, gm(., t, ξ,m)(x) = xm¯, and ∂xgm(., t, X˜,m)(x) =
m¯.
• Second moment: If g(., t, x,m) = 12
∫
y2m(t, dy) then,
lim
ǫ→0+
d
dǫ
g(., t, x,m+ ǫd) =
1
2
∫
ξ2 d(dξ).
gm(., t, x,m)(ξ) =
1
2ξ
2. Hence, gm(., t, ξ,m)(x) =
1
2x
2. ∂xgm(., t, X˜,m)(x) =
x.
• α−th moment: g(., t, x,m) = ∫ yαm(t, dy) then, limǫ→0+ ddǫg(., t, x,m +
ǫd) =
∫
ξα d(dξ). Thus, gm(., t, ξ,m)(x) = x
α, and ∂xgm(., t, X˜,m)(x) =
αxα−1.
• α−norm: g(., t, x,m) = (∫ |y|αm(t, dy))1/α = m1/αα then,
lim
ǫ→0+
d
dǫ
g(., t, x,m+ ǫd)
=
1
α
[∫
|ξ|α m(dξ)
] 1
α
−1 [∫
|ξ|α d(dξ)
]
.
Thus, gm(., t, ξ,m)(x) =
xα
αmα−1α
, and ∂xgm(., t, X˜,m)(x) =
xα−1
mα−1α
.
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• Lα−normed drift: We compute the Gateaux-derivative of the Lα−normed
drifts: b¯m(., t, x,m)(ξ) :=
bα(.,t,x,ξ)
αb¯α−1
. By changing variables, one has b¯m(., t, ξ,m)(x) :=
bα(.,t,ξ,x)
αb¯α−1(t,ξ,m)
. We differentiate with the respect to x to get:
∂xb¯m(., t, ξ,m)(x) =
bα−1(., t, ξ, x)by(., t, ξ, x)
b¯α−1(t, ξ,m)
. (11)
E[L∂xb¯m(., t,X,m)(x)] = E[L
bα−1(.,t,X,x)by(.,t,X,x)
b¯α−1(t,X,m)
] := E˜[L˜
bα−1(.,t,X˜,x)by(.,t,X˜,x)
b¯α−1(t,X˜,m)
],
where the notation E˜ denotes the expectation with the respect to the vari-
ables with X˜ which is an copy of X. We now replace the argument x by
X to get E˜[L˜∂xb¯m(., t, X˜,m)(X)] = E˜[L˜
bα−1(.,t,X˜,X)by(.,t,X˜,X)
b¯α−1(t,X˜,m)
]. If α = 1,
one gets E˜[L˜by(., t, X˜,X)].
We now introduce the first order adjoint processes involved in the risk-
sensitive SMP. The (risk-sensitive) first order adjoint equation is the following
backward SDE of mean-field type:

dp(t) = −
{
Hθx(t) +
1
vθ(t)E[v
θ(t)∂xH
θ
m(t)]
}
dt
+q(t)(−θℓ(t)dt+ dBt),
dvθ(t) = θℓ(t)vθ(t)dBt,
vθ(T ) = φθ(T ),
p(T ) = −hx(T )− 1φθ(T )E[φθ(T )∂xhm(T )].
(12)
where,
φθ(T ) := eθ[h(x¯(T ),m¯(T ))+
∫
T
0
f(t,x¯(t),m¯(t),u¯(t))dt]. (13)
Note that the Hamiltonian terms in (12) are evaluated at the optimal state
and optimal control (x¯(·), u¯(·)), i.e., Hθk(t, x¯(t), m¯(t), u¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), ℓ(t)), k ∈
{x,m}.
Lemma 1 ([9, 8]). Consider the following mean-field backward SDE
p(t) = p(T ) +
∫ T
t
E˜[fˆ(s, p˜(s), q˜(s), p(s), q(s))] ds
−
∫ T
t
q(s)dB(s),
where p(T ) is a progressively measurable, square integrable random variable. Let
fˆ(t, ., ., ., .) be Lipschitz for all time t ∈ [0, T ] and t 7→ f(t, 0, 0, 0, 0) be square
integrable over [0, T ]. Then, the mean-field backward SDE has a unique adapted
solution satisfying
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|p(t)|2 +
∫ T
0
|q(t)|2dt
]
<∞. (14)
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Note that, by choosing fˆ(t, p˜(t), q˜(t), p(t), q(t)) = a0(t, .)+a1(t, .)p˜(t)+a2(t, .)q˜(t)+
a3(t, .)p+ a4(t, .)q(t) where ai(t, .) are measurable bounded coefficient functions,
one gets a backward equation in the form of the adjoint equations.
Proposition 2. If the functions b, σ, f, h, are twice continuously differentiable
with respect to (x,m) and b, σ, f, h and all their first order derivatives with
respect to (x,m) are continuous in (x,m, u), and bounded then (12) admits an
lF-adapted solution (p¯, q¯, vθ, ℓ) such that
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|p¯(t)|2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|vθ(t)|2
+
∫ T
0
(|q¯(t)|2 + |ℓ(t)|2) dt
]
<∞. (15)
In addition, if b > 0 then (12) admits a unique lF-adapted solution.
Proof. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, the processes p, q solve a back-
ward SDE coupled with the process vθ. Moreover, these equations can be trans-
formed into linear SDEs of mean-field-type, which involves (p, q, E[p], E[q]) and
random coefficients involving (x, Lθ := v
θ
E[φθ(T )]
, l). We now check that the co-
efficients of the linear SDEs does not blow-up within the horizon [0, T ]. For the
functions σ, f, h, and their derivatives the boundedness follow from the assump-
tion. However, it is not immediate for the drift coefficient b¯ . We recall that
b¯x, b¯m, b¯xm are not clearly defined at the point where b(., t, x, .) is zero. Since
α ≥ 1, we replace these terms by any representation in the sub-differential set.
All terms are bounded by M = supt∈[0,T ] sup |bx(t, .)|. The process vθ(t) is al-
most surely bounded. Then, for each direction chosen in the sub-differential,
the assumptions of Lemma 1 are fulfilled and hence, the existence of solution to
the first order risk-sensitive adjoint equations follows. Moreover, if b > 0 then
the denominator does not vanish and b¯x and ∂xb¯m are (uniquely) well-defined,
and bounded by M. Using Lemma 1 again we get existence and uniqueness of
solution.
Note that the boundedness and differentiation conditions can be weaken
by using the techniques developed in [7, 15]. The following Proposition is the
stochastic maximum principle for Problem (1).
Proposition 3. (Risk-sensitive maximum principle) Let the Assumptions
of Proposition 2 hold. If (x¯(·), u¯(·)) is an optimal solution of the risk-sensitive
control problem (1)-(3), then there are two pairs of lF-adapted processes (vθ, ℓ),
(p¯, q¯) that satisfy (12)-(15) respectively, such that
Hθ(t, x¯(t), m¯(t), u¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), ℓ(t))
= max
u
Hθ(t, x¯(t), m¯(t), u, p¯(t), q¯(t), ℓ(t)),
for almost every t ∈ [0, T ] and P−almost surely.
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Proof. To prove the SMP, we use a logarithmic transformation and follows sim-
ilar steps as in [22].
Below we provide an explicit representation of the process of the SMP via a
dual approach and partial differential equations of mean-field type.
3 Mean-Field-Type Games: two or more risk-
sensitive players
We now consider two or more risk-sensitive players. The risk-sensitivity index
of player i is θi. The best response to u−i,m is the following problem :

J¯θi (ui(·), u−i(·)) =
1
θi
log
(
Eeθi[
∫
T
0
fi(t,x
u(t),mu(t),u(t)) dt+hi(x
u(T ),mu(T ))]
)
,
infui J¯
θ
i (ui, u−i)
subject to
dxu(t) = b¯(t, xu(t),mu(t), u(t)) dt+ σ(t, xu(t))dB(t),
xu(0) = x0,
mu(t) := L(xu(t)),
(16)
where u−i denotes (u1, . . . , ui, ui+1, . . . , un), n ≥ 2. and by abuse of notation,
u = (ui, u−i). Note that we cannot impose indistinguishability of the players
since θi and the objectives fi, hi may be different across the players.
3.1 Main Result
We now present the key results of the paper. The risk-sensitive game with cost
Jθi solves a system of risk-sensitive HJB equations
0 = Vi,t(µ) +
∫
inf
u
[
b¯∂xVi,µ(µ)(t, x, z) + f∂zVi,µ(µ)(t, x, z)
+
σ2
2
∂xxVi,µ(µ)(t, x, z)
]
µ(t, dx, dz), (17)
which is a partial differential equation with state µ (in infinite dimension). If we
denote v∗i (t, x, z) := Vi,µ(t, µ)(t, x, z) as a dual function (because of the Gateaux
derivative with the respect to µ) then (v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
n) is in finite dimension and
solves the dual system
0 = v∗i,t(t, x, z) + v
∗
i,z(t, x, z)H
∗
i (t, x,
v∗i,x(t, x, z)
v∗i,z(t, x, z)
,m) (18)
+
1
2
σ2v∗i,xx(t, x, z) +∫
w˜
v∗i,z(t, w˜)H
∗
i,m(t, x˜,
v∗i,x(t, w˜)
v∗i,z(t, w˜)
,m)(x) µ(t, dw˜)
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
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where Hi is the Hamiltonian, ui ∈ argminHi, w˜ = (x˜, z˜), and m(t, x) =∫
µ(t, x, dz1 . . . dzn), and µ(t, .) solves the Kolmogorov equation in which u is
replaced by the optimal strategies (u1, u2, . . . , un). Then (p
∗
i , q
∗
i , η
∗
i , li) solves the
(risk-sensitive) stochastic maximum principle system given by:

dp∗i = −
[
H∗i,x +
1
η∗i
E[η∗i ∂xH
∗
i,m] + σx(
σv∗i,xx
η∗i
)
−p∗i (l∗i )2 +
σl∗i v
∗
i,xx
η∗i
]
+ (−p∗i l∗i +
σv∗i,xx
η∗i
)dBi
dη∗i = η
∗
i l
∗
i dBi,
η∗i (T ) = θie
θi[zi(T )+hi(x(T ),m(T ))],
qi = (−p∗i l∗i +
σv∗i,xx
η∗i
)
p∗i (T ) = hi,x(T ) +
1
φθi (T )
E[φθi (T )∂xhi,m(T )],
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
(19)
where,
φθi (T ) := e
θi[hi(x¯(T ),m¯(T ))+
∫
T
0
fi(t,x¯(t),m¯(t),u¯(t))dt]. (20)
3.2 Dynamic programming for risk-sensitive mean-field-
type games
We establish a dynamic programming principle in infinite dimension. We first
write the objectives as a function of the infinite dimensional state µ which
satisfies the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation
µt = −∂x[b¯µ]− ∂z(fµ) + 1
2
∂xx(σ
2µ) =: b˜, (21)
with the initial distribution µ(0, dx, dz) = m0(dx)δ0(dz). The advantage now
is that µ(.) is a deterministic object the cost can be rewritten in a deterministic
manner as
Jθi =
∫
µ(T, dx, dz) eθi(zi+hi(x,
∫
z˜
µ(T,.,dz˜))) .
This a terminal cost in the sense it is evaluated only at µ(T, .). Since there is no
running cost, one can write directly the HJB equation using classical calculus
of variations for
Vi(t, µ(t, .)) = inf
u
∫
µ(T, dx, dz) eθi(zi+hi(x,
∫
z˜
µ(T,.,dz˜))),
starting from µ(t, .) at time t :
0 = Vi,t + inf
u
[〈b˜, Vi,µ〉],
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where
〈b˜, Vi,µ〉 =
∫
Vi,µ(µ)(x˜, z˜)b˜(x˜, z˜) dx˜dz˜ (22)
= −
∫
Vi,µ(µ)(x, z){∂x[b¯µ] + ∂z(fiµ)} (23)
+
∫
Vi,µ(µ)(x, z)
1
2
∂xx(σ
2µ) dxdz (24)
=
∫ [
b¯∂xVi,µ + fi∂zVi,µ +
σ2
2
∂xxVi,µ
]
µ(t, dx, dz)
As we can see, the required working state for player i is (x, zi), therefore the
partial derivatives of Vi with respect to z are only considered for zi. The risk-
sensitive HJB minimum principle yields
0 = Vi,t +
∫
inf
u
[
b¯∂xVi,µ + fi∂zVi,µ
+
σ2
2
∂xxVi,µ
]
µ(t, dx, dz), (25)
This is an infinite dimensional PDE on (t, µ). Below we provide a simpler opti-
mality equation (i.e., the state will be in finite dimension) by setting p∗i =
∂xVi,µ
∂zVi,µ
and Vi,µ(µ)(t, x, z) = v
∗
i (t, x, z). Differentiating (25) with the respect to µ one
gets
0 = ∂tVi,µ(µ)(t, x, z) + Hˆi(µ) (26)
+
∫
Hˆi,µ(µ)(t, x˜, z˜)µ(t, dx˜, dz˜)
where
Hˆi = b¯∂xVi,µ + fi∂zVi,µ +
σ2
2
∂xxVi,µ (27)
where H∗i (t, x, p
∗,m) = infu[b¯p
∗
i + fi].
Definition 2. The function v∗i (t, x, z) := Vi,µ(µ)(t, x, z) is called Dual Function
associated with the best response value of player i.
v∗i (t, x, z) := Vi,µ(µ)(t, x, z) solves the PDE (18) where the state is now
reduced to (x, z) which is in finite dimension.
Below we show that if there exists a dual function (in the sense of weak
derivatives) then its weak derivatives provide a risk-sensitive SMP.
3.3 Dual functions associated with the best response val-
ues
In a risk-neutral setting, Bensoussan et al. have established in [28] a partial
differential equation as a necessary condition for optimality under smoothness
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assumption. We apply the methodology to the risk-sensitive case. The basic
idea consists to write the optimality inequality as Jθi (ui+ǫdi, u−i,m
ui+ǫdi,u−i)−
Jθi (u,m
u) ≥ 0 for the cost functional Jθ. By introducing the auxiliary state z
such that dzi = fi(.) dt, zi(0) = 0, the risk-sensitive game problem is trans-
formed into mean-field-type game problem without running cost. The terminal
cost is eθi[zi(T )+hi(x(T ),m(T ))]. Since the state is augmented to be (x, z), the first
order adjoint process becomes (p1i, p2i, qi) and the unmaximized Hamiltonian
is b¯p1i + fp2i + σqi. Since the diffusion does not depend on the control u, the
derivative of this term with the respect to u can be written as p2i∂u[b¯
p1i
p2i
+ fi],
whenever p2i 6= 0.
Let v∗i (t, x, z) be the dual function defined above, satisfying (18) where µ =
L(xu(t), zu(t)), the x−marginal is m(t, .) = ∫ µ(t, ., dz) and
H∗i (t, x, p
∗,m) = inf
u
[b¯p∗i + fi].
The terminal condition is
v∗i (T, x, z) = e
θi(zi+hi(x,m(T )))
+θi
∫
hi,m(x˜,m(T ))(x)e
θi(z˜i+hi(x˜,m(T ))) µ(T, dx˜, dz˜).
If (v∗i )i solves the dual equation (18) then
lim
ǫ→0+
d
dǫ
Jθi =
∫
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X
v∗i,zHi,u(t, x,m, u,
v∗i,x
v∗i,z
,
σv∗i,xx
2v∗i,z
) µ(t, x, z)dxdt
and Hi,u = 0 for interior optimal control u. Let vi be a function in the Lebesgue
space L1(I), with I = [a, b] a compact interval of R, a < b. We say that
w ∈ L1(I) is a ”weak derivative” of v if,∫
I
v(t)ϕ′(t)dt = −
∫
I
w(t)ϕ(t)dt,
for all infinitely differentiable functions ϕ with ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = 0.
Equation (18) is an interesting partial differential equation. Indeed, if there
is a solution v∗(t, x, z) to (18) that is three times weakly differentiable then
the partial weak derivatives of v∗(t, x, z) solves the risk-sensitive SMP (12).
Below we identify explicitly the processes solution to the risk-sensitive SMP.
Let p∗i (t) =
v∗i,x(t,x
u(t),zu(t))
v∗i,z(t,x
u(t),zu(t)) =
∂xVi,µ(t,x
u(t),zu(t))
∂zVi,µ(t,xu(t),zu(t))
where the derivatives are taken
in a distribution sense (weak derivative). Then the process p∗ evaluated at the
optimal trajectory solves the backward SDE:
dp∗i = −
[
H∗i,x +
1
η∗i
E[η∗i ∂xH
∗
i,m]
]
dt
− [σx(q∗i + p∗i l∗i ) + q∗i l∗i ] dt+ q∗i dB, (28)
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where
q∗i = −p∗i l∗i +
σv∗i,xx
η∗i
, l∗i = σ∂x[log η
∗
i ],
η∗i := v
∗
i,z(t, x, z) = ∂zVi,µ(µ)(t, x, z),
We impose a strong smoothness on v∗ and show that η∗ solves a backward
SDE similar to the one satisfied by vθ.
Proposition 4. η∗i := v
∗
i,z(t, x, z) solves the backward SDE:
dη∗i = η
∗
i l
∗
i dB, η
∗
i (T ) = θie
θi[zi(T )+hi(x(T ),m(T ))]. (29)
Proof. By Ito’s formula, we have
dη∗i := dv
∗
iz(t, x, z) (30)
= [v∗i,zt + v
∗
i,xz b¯+ v
∗
i,zzfi +
1
2
σ2v∗i,xxz]dt+ σv
∗
i,xzdB.
From (18) it is clear that the partial (weak) derivative of the integral term with
the respect to z is zero (because it does not depend on z). We differentiate (18)
to get
v∗i,zt + ∂z
[
v∗i,zH
∗
i (t, x,
v∗i,x
v∗i,z
,m)
]
+
1
2
σ2v∗i,zxx = 0,
which means that the drift term is v∗i,tz + v
∗
i,xz b¯+ v
∗
i,zzf +
1
2σ
2v∗i,zxx = 0. Thus,
dη∗i = σv
∗
i,xzdB. Lets compute the diffusion coefficient more explicitly:
σv∗i,xz =
v∗i,z
v∗i,z
σv∗i,xz = η
∗
i l
∗
i . (31)
Hence, one gets
dη∗i = η
∗
i l
∗
i dB, η
∗
i (T ) = θie
θi[zi(T )+hi(x(T ),m(T ))].
Proposition 5. The function (η∗1 , . . . , η
∗
n) solves the partial differential equa-
tion:
0 = η∗i,t + η
∗
i,xb¯+ η
∗
i,zfi +
1
2
σ2η∗i,xx (32)
whenever these derivatives make sense. Moreover η∗i has a constant sign and
has the same sign as θi.
Proof. This follows from a weak derivative with the respect to zi in Eq. (18).
Note that the function m in Proposition 5 is the marginal of µ with the
respect to x and µ solves the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation with
drifts (b¯, f) and diffusion coefficient (σ, 0) :
µt + ∂x[b¯µ] + ∂z(fµ)− 1
2
∂xx(σ
2µ) = 0, (33)
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Table 1: Internet attacks over the globe. An increase of around 13.02%
Online Attacks
North America Europe Asia Australia
New York 617 150 Germany 571255 India 2 353 001 Australia 705594
Virginia 452916 Romania 226018 China 772447
Illinois 401766 Sweden 138543 Bangladesh 106102
California 343627
Texas 309426
Ohio 110137
Florida 106779
µ(0, dx, dz) = m0(dx)δ0(dz). In view of Proposition 4, (p¯i, q¯i, v
θ
i , ℓi) = (−p∗i , q∗i , η
∗
i
θi
, θil
∗
i )
solves the risk-sensitive SMP (12) and
dp∗i = −
[
H∗i,x +
1
η∗i
E[η∗i ∂xH
∗
i,m] + σx(
σv∗i,xx
η∗i
)
]
dt (34)
−
[
−p∗i (l∗i )2 +
σl∗i v
∗
i,xx
η∗i
]
dt+ (−p∗i l∗i +
σv∗i,xx
η∗
)dB,
p∗i (T ) = hi,x(x(T ),m(T )) +
E˜
[
eθi(z˜i(T )+h(x˜(T ),m(T ))) ∂xhi,m(x˜(T ),m(T ))(x(T ))
]
eθi(zi(T )+hi(x(T ),m(T )))
The function v∗(t, .) = ∂µV is not the value function in the sense of Bellman
because of the presence of the term E[Hi,m] in Eq. (18). v
∗(t, .) is the adjoint
function (dual function) associated to mean-field-type best-response problem.
Interestingly, in the mean-field free case, i.e., when hi,m = 0, fi,m = 0, bi,m = 0,
the dual function (v∗1(t, .), . . . , v
∗
n(t, .)) coincides with the best-response value
function of the risk-sensitive game problem with augmented state (x, z).
4 Virus Spread over an evolving network
WiFi network security has gained significant attention in research and indus-
trial communities as a result of the global connectivity provided by the Internet.
This has led to a variety of traditional defense mechanisms ranging from cryp-
tography, firewalls, antivirus software, to intrusion detection systems. Table 1
displays a sample number of network attacks by major geographic region (State
or Country) with more than 100 000 attacks. See [38] for more details on real
time web attack monitoring.
A virus that spreads through WiFi networks as effectively as a human cold
moves through cities, airports, public transport areas has been explored re-
cently. The virus can travel between WiFi networks via Access Points (APs)
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that connect households and businesses to WiFi networks. It can also propa-
gate through femto cell and small cell networks. We denote by x the state of
the entire network. x could represent the number of access points that can be
reached with infected relays (hotspots) at a specific period of the day. Since the
number of access points that are active is highly stochastic and the number of
nodes in the network is time-varying, x is a random process. We do not consider
a mass-action principle because there is no conservation of mass in this case,
the population itself is random. It is unclear that the random process can be
driven by Brownian but here we assume a small noise effect for simplicity. Users
move over several geographical areas and some of them may carry portable wifi
access points. Thus, the network is mobile and random. Each access point may
interact with other hotspots in a certain neighborhood of communication and
then the information/host propagates over multiple hops. In this setting an
increasing rate is observed within the last decade. To capture this phenomenon,
we propose an Lα−norm drift model for the rate[46]. The control parameter u1
of the attacker may represent for example the rate at which the virus attempts
transmission over the access points.
4.1 State dynamics models
With explosive growth of mobile devices and the internet of things (IoT), there
is an increasing number of vulnerable devices and machines connected to these
networks and hotspots so that the mass is not conserved. The population has
a tendency the growth (in expectation). To Illustrate this we consider an infor-
mation propagation model where the state is given by
dx = γ(x)dt + σdB,
where γ(x) = κx(1 − xK ), κ,K > 0, x(0) ∈ (0,K). Figure 1 represents the
evolution of the state under different noises. In Figure 1 the parameters are
κ = 10,K = 2, and σ ∈ {0, 1} and different noise terms are plotted. Starting
from a initial state value x(0) = 0.3, we observe that the population state has
tendency to move around 2 within the time interval [0, 1].
4.2 The state needs to be controlled
Due to the presence of malicious attack in the network, there are lot of security,
privacy concerns so that the state needs to be controlled [3]. To illustrate the
model we introduce an attacker and a defender. Each of them has a control
parameter, and has to make a certain decision on those parameters.
dx = [γ(x) + u1 − u2]dt+ σdB,
u1 is the attacker control strategy and u2 is the defender control strategy. In
Figure 2 we represent the case where a significant control effort e = u2−u1 = 0.3
is injected into the system. We observe that the control affects significantly
the state dynamics and help towards a certain goal. For a significant effort
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Figure 1: State dynamics with three different noises.
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Uncontrolled State Dynamics
Figure 2: Effect of control effort e = u2 − u1 = 0.3 in the state.
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Uncontrolled State Dynamics
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e = u2 − u1 = 0.3 invested into security, the state of infection can stay below
the level 2 starting from level 1. This means that control helps to reduce the
infection rate and improve security. However, the location of mobile devices and
WiFi hotspots may be important in some cases, specially when local interaction
and communications arise. In order to capture this phenomenon we introduce a
non-linear behavior via the geographical location distribution and the intensity
of interaction at time t as m(t, dy) and we introduce b(t, x, y, u1, u2) = y[γ(x)+
u1 − u2], and the state dynamics becomes
dx = |γ(x) + u1 − u2|[
∫
y
yαm(t, dy)]
1
α dt+ σdB.
The variable y can be seen as the intensity of interaction of infected de-
vices/hosts.
Figure 3: Effect of the mean-field term when the effort is e = u2 − u1 = 0.3.
Open-Loop case.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
0< time < 1
St
at
e 
Ev
ol
ut
io
n
Add noise using σ h1/2 W
 
 
Effect of mean−field term
As we can see in Figure 3, the mean-field term [
∫
y
yαm(t, dy)]
1
α affects sig-
nificantly the state dynamics in a multiplicative manner. The infection time
increases rapidly with the mean-field term. Figure 4 uses a state feedback strat-
egy in the form of [
∫
y
yαm(t, dy)]
1
αx, with α = 1.2.We observe that the infection
state is significantly reduced compared to the open-loop case of Figure 3. This
is illustrated in Figure 5 for several initial states. Hence, it is important to
strategically control the mean-field term so that the infected machines remains
limited and the damage minimized. In order to do such a minimization we
introduce below some objective functions.
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Figure 4: Effect of the mean-field term under state and mean-field feedback
strategies.
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Effect of mean−field term
Figure 5: Feedback strategies help to control and maintain the state below a
certain range with high probability.
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4.3 Objectives
In the context of delay/disruption tolerant networks it can be shown that the de-
lay and the probability of receiving the information have a natural risk-sensitive
structure via Poisson arrival rates. However, the attacker and the network de-
fense may not have the same sensitivity when facing the risk. We denote by
θ1 = θa the attacker risk-sensitivity index and by θ2 = θd the defender risk in-
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dex. The cost of the attacker is f1(x,m, u1, u2) =
1
2u
2
1 and its terminal benefit
(opposite signed for minimization) is h1 = − c1α xα − c¯1αmα, where mα denotes
the α−th moment of the state process. The goal for the attacker is then to find
a tradeoff between the attack effort cost − 12u21 and the benefit c1α xα + c¯1αmα.
Figure 6: A typical one step cost function.
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The cost of the defender (could be the system administrator) is decom-
posed into damage cost and security investment loss is f2 =
1
2x
2 + 12u
2
2, h2 =
c1
α x
α + c¯1αmα, c1 ≥ 0, c¯1 ≥ 0. For simplicity, the drift is chosen as b¯ = ‖b‖α
where b(t, x, y, u1, u2) = y[γ(x) + u1 − u2], γ(x) ≥ 1. The control variables are
limited to the interval [0, 1] at any time and the diffusion coefficient is system-
size dependent: σn(t) :=
σ
n(t) where n(t) is a random variable representing the
(active) system size at t. Since there are multiple defense strategies, here we
do pull them together in a cooperative manner as an ideal target. However, as
observed in practice, the defender may not coordinate their defense strategies
due to non-alignment of objectives and/or professional privacy issues. Figure 6
represents a typical instantatenous cost. In Figure 7 we plotted the evolution
of a typical cost (random) invested into security over time.
These functions are not bounded, and we cannot use directly the existence
results established above. However, we provide the optimality equation for the
interior case and derive a risk-sensitive SMP.
Hi = m
1/α
α [γ(x) + u1 − u2]pi + fi.
The attacker’s optimal strategy is
u1 = [−m1/αα p1]10,
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Figure 7: Evolution of the cost invested into security.
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where [a]10 := min(1,max(0, a)). The defender’s optimal strategy is
u2 = [m
1/α
α p2]
1
0,
where p1, p2, solve the risk-sensitive SMP system :
dpi = −{Hi,x + 1
vθi
E[vθi ∂xHi,m]}dt+ qi(−θilidt+ dB).
where Hi,x = m
1/α
α γ
′(x)pi + fi,x, f1,x = 0, f2,x = x, Hi,m(., t, ξ,m)(x) =
xα
αmα−1α
[γ(x) + u1 − u2]pi, and
∂xHi,m(., t, X˜,m)(x) =
xα−1
mα−1α
[γ(x) + u1 − u2]pi + x
α
αmα−1α
γ′(x)pi.
4.4 Backward-Forward System

dp1 = −{H1,x + 1vθ1 E[v
θ
1∂xH1,m]}dt+ q1(−θ1l1dt+ dB),
dp2 = −{H2,x + 1vθ2 E[v
θ
2∂xH2,m]}dt+ q2(−θ2l2dt+ dB),
dxu(t) = b¯(., t, xu(t),mu(t), u(t)) dt+ σdB(t),
xu(0) = x0, m
u(t) := L(xu(t)),
(35)
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Figure 8: Mean-field over time, the initial and final distribution, and the evolu-
tion of the expected values.
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where vθi , li and the terminal conditions solve (19) with the optimal strategies
(u1, u2) = ([−m1/αα p1]10, [m1/αα p2]10).
We investigate (35) numerically under stochastic Euler scheme (also called
Euler-Maruyama scheme). We choose α = 1.2. We set θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.3, c1 =
0.8 = c¯1.The initial distribution is concentrated around two points: 1 and 2.
This can be extended to capture a geographical area where the attacks are con-
centrated in two main countries. In Figure 8, we plot the state distribution over
time, the initial and final distribution, and the evolution of the expected values.
We observe that the distribution moves progressively towards higher states.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied mean-field-type games with a drift that has
Lα−norm structure. Although this norm is not differentiable, it is possible
to get existence of solutions. We have established relationship between the risk-
sensitive SMP and the dual functions. This allow us to verify the risk-sensitive
SMP equations. When, the drift is mean-field free, we retrieve the classical
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risk-sensitive equations. The work can be extended in several ways. First, the
interaction model in the drift b(t, x, y, u) (which is pairwise interaction) can
be modified to include k−wise interaction in the form b(t, x, y1, . . . , yk, u) with
the measure
∏k
l=1 m(t, dyl). This is, in particular, useful for the control of
virus spread over network where the interaction involves multiple nodes at a
time. Second, the explicit solutions or qualitative analysis of SMP need to be
conducted. Third, when α < 1, we do not have a norm and the triangular
inequality does not hold. In that case, quasi-norm type of inequalities need to
established. We leave these open issues for future research.
References
[1] Jovanovic, B. (1982): Selection and the Evolution of Industry, Economet-
rica 50, 649-670.
[2] B. Jovanovic and R. W. Rosenthal (1988). Anonymous sequential games,
Journal of Mathematical Economics, volume 17, pages 77-87.
[3] Dario Bauso, Ben Mansour Dia, Boualem Djehiche, Hamidou Tembine ,
Raul Tempone (2014), Mean-Field Games for Marriage, PLoS ONE 9(5):
e94933. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094933
[4] A. Bensoussan, , S. C. P. Yam, B. Djehiche and H. Tembine (2014), Risk-
Sensitive Mean-Field-Type Control, Preprint.
[5] Andersson, D. and Djehiche, B. (2010), A maximum principle for SDE’s of
mean-field type. Appl. Math. Optim. 63(3), 341-356.
[6] A. Bensoussan, K. C. J. Sung, S. C. P. Yam, and S. P. Yung (2012). Linear-
quadratic mean-field games. Preprint.
[7] Bahlali K., Djehiche B. and Mezerdi B. (2007), On the stochastic maxi-
mum principle in optimal control of degenerate diffusions with Lipschitz
coefficients. Appl. Math. and Optim., 56(3), pp. 364-378.
[8] Buckdahn, R., B. Djehiche, B. and Li, J. (2011), A general stochastic maxi-
mum principle for sdes of mean-field type. Applied Math. and Optimization,
64(2), 197-216.
[9] Buckdahn R. and Li J. and Peng S. (2009), Mean-field backward stochas-
tic differential equations and related partial differential equations, Stoch.
Process. Appl. ,119(10), 3133-3154.
[10] Chighoub, F., Mezerdi, B. (2013). A stochastic maximum principle in mean-
field optimal control problems for jump diffusions, Arab Journal of Math-
ematical Sciences, Volume 19, Issue 2, July, Pages 223-241.
26
[11] El-Karoui, N. and Hamade`ne, S. (2003), BSDEs and risk-sensitive control,
zero-sum and nonzero-sum game problems of stochastic functional differ-
ential equations. Stoch. Process. Appl. (107), 145-169.
[12] Hafayed, M. (2013), A mean-field maximum principle for optimal control
of forward-backward stochastic differential equations with Poisson jump
processes, International Journal of Dynamics and Control, December 2013,
Volume 1, Issue 4, pp 300-315.
[13] Hosking, J. (2012), A stochastic maximum principle for a stochastic differ-
ential game of a mean-field type. Appl. Math. and Optim. 66, pp. 415-454,
2012.
[14] Jacobson, D.H. (1973), Optimal stochastic linear systems with exponential
criteria and their relation to differential games. Trans. Automat. Control
AC, 18, 124-131.
[15] Jourdain, B., Me´le´ard, S. and Woyczynski, W. (2008): Nonlinear SDEs
driven by Le´vy processes and related PDEs. Alea 4, 1-29.
[16] Li, J. (2012), Stochastic maximum principle in the mean-field controls.
Automatica, 48, pp. 366-373.
[17] Lim A E B, Zhou X (2005). A new risk-sensitive maximum principle. IEEE
Trans Autom Cont, 50(7): 958-966.
[18] Shen, Y. and Siu, T. K. (2013), The maximum principle for a jump-diffusion
mean-field model and its application to the mean-variance problem, Non-
linear Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications, Volume 86, July, Pages
58-73.
[19] Shi, J. and Wu, Z. (2011), A risk-sensitive stochastic maximum principle for
optimal control of jump diffusions and its applications. Acta Mathematica
Scientia, 31(2), pp. 419-433, 2011.
[20] Shi, J. and Wu, Z. (2012), Maximum Principle for Risk-Sensitive Stochastic
Optimal Control Problem and Applications to Finance, Stochastic Analysis
and Applications, Volume, 30, Issue 6.
[21] Tembine H. and Zhu Q. and Basar T. (2014). Risk-sensitive mean-field
games, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 59, 4, pp. 835 - 850,
DOI 10.1109/TAC.2013.2289711
[22] Djehiche B., Tembine H (2015) : A Stochastic Maximum Principle for
Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field-Type Control, IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, to appear.
[23] K. Kometani, H. Shimizu (1975). A study of self-organizing processes of
nonlinear stochastic variables, Journal of Statistical Physics, December
1975, Volume 13, Issue 6, pp 473-490.
27
[24] Djehiche B., Basar T. and Tembine H : Mean-Field-Type Game Theory,
Springer, under preparation 2014.
[25] Haynatzka V.R., Gani J., Rachev S.T (2000): The Spread of AIDS among
interactive transmission groups. Mathematical and computer modeling, 32,
pp 169-180.
[26] Tembine, H. (2012). Distributed strategic learning for wireless engineers,
CRC Press, Taylor & Francis, 496 pages.
[27] A. Bensoussan (2006), Explicit solutions of linear quadratic differential
games, Chapter 2 in Stochastic Processes, Optimization, and Control The-
ory: Applications in Financial Engineering, Queueing Networks, and Man-
ufacturing Systems, International Series in Operations Research and Man-
agement Science Volume 94, 2006, pp 19-34.
[28] Bensoussan A., Frehse J., Yam S.C.P. ( 2013): Mean Field Games andMean
Field Type Control Theory, SpringerBriefs in Mathematics, Springer.
[29] D. Aldous (1985). Exchangeability and related topics. In Hennequin, P.,
Editor, Ecole d’ Ete de Probabilites de Saint-Flour XIII - 1983, Springer-
Verlag, Heidelberg. Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1117, pages 1-198.
[30] J. R. Blum, H. Chernoff, M. Rosenblatt, and H. Teicher (1958). Central
limit theorems for interchangeable processes. Canad. J. Math., page 10.
[31] B. de Finetti (1931). Funzione caratteristica di un fenomeno aleatorio. atti
della r. academia nazionale dei lincei, serie 6. memorie, classe di scienze
fisiche, mathematice e naturale. 4:251-299.
[32] E. Hewitt and L. J. Savage (1955). Symmetric measures on cartesian prod-
ucts. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, 80:470- 501.
[33] P. Kotolenez and Kurtz T (2010). Macroscopic limits for stochastic par-
tial differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type. Probab. Theory Relat.
Fields, (146):189-222.
[34] J. Trashorras (2002). Large deviations for a triangular array of exchange-
able random variables. Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincare, Probability
and Statistics, 38: 649-680.
[35] C. Villani (2009). Optimal transport, old and new. 338 of Grundlehren der
mathematischen Wissenschaften, Springer, ISBN 978-3-540-71049- 3.
[36] Cisse A.K, Tembine H (2014): Cooperative Mean-Field Type Games, Proc.
of 19th World Congress The International Federation of Automatic Control
Cape Town, South Africa. August 24-29.
[37] Lauriere Mathieu, Pironneau Olivier (2014), Dynamic programming for
mean-field type control, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, t. , Serie I.
28
[38] Realtime web attack monitoring (2014) at
http://www.akamai.com/html/technology/real-time-web-monitor.html
[39] James Bergin, Dan Bernhardt (1992), Anonymous Sequential Games with
Aggregate Uncertainty, Journal of Mathematical Economics Volume 21,
Issue 6, Pages 543-562
[40] Jean-David Benamou and Yann Brenier (2000). A computational fluid me-
chanics solution to the Monge-Kantorovich mass transfer problem. Numer.
Math., 84(3):375-393.
[41] J. D. Benamou and Y. Brenier (2001). Mixed L2-Wasserstein optimal
mapping between prescribed density functions. J. Optim. Theory Appl.,
111(2):255-271.
[42] H. Tembine (2014), Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field-Type Games with Lp−norm
Drifts, Automatica, to appear.
[43] Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions (2007). Mean field games. Jpn.
J. Math., 2(1):229-260.
[44] M.Y. Huang, R.P. Malhame and P.E. Caines (2006). Large Population
Stochastic Dynamic Games: Closed-Loop McKean-Vlasov Systems and the
Nash Certainty Equivalence Principle, Special issue in honor of the 65th
birthday of Tyrone Duncan, Communications in Information and Systems.
Vol 6, Number 3, pp 221-252.
[45] Djehiche B. and Tembine H. (2014): A Stochastic Maximum Principle
for Risk-Sensitive Mean-Field-Type Control under Partial observation.
Stochastic of Environmental and Financial Economics, CAS SEFE Pro-
ceedings.
[46] H. Tembine (2014): Energy-Constrained Mean-Field Games in Wireless
Networks, Strategic Behavior and the Environment: Vol. 4: No. 2, pp 187-
211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000040
Appendix
A Mean-field convergence
The extension of (i) the law of large numbers, (ii) central limit theorem and
(iii) large deviation principle, from independent random variables to sequences
of indistinguishable random variables has drawn the attention of a number of
researchers ever since the appearance in Blum, Chernoff and co-authors [30].
Below we present some well-known results and explain how they can be used in
the McKean-Vlasov context with the Lα−norm.
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A.1 Indistinguishability
The notion of indistinguishability (or exchangeability or interchangeability) is
introduced in order to discuss the existence of a limiting measure and mean-field
convergence of the empirical measure of virtual particle states in the framework
of de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage [31, 32, 29, 33, 34].
Let X be a separable complete and metrizable topological space (Polish
space).
Definition 3 (Indistinguishability). A collection (x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)) of X−valued
random variables/processes, is indistinguishable (or exchangeable) if the joint
law is invariant by permutation over the index set {1, . . . , n}, i.e., for any per-
mutation σ over the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, one has
L(x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)) = L(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)), (36)
where L(X) denotes the law of the random variable X. An infinite family of
random variables/processes (x(1), x(2), . . .) is indistinguishable if every finite n,
the family (x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)) is indistinguishable.
This says that the order (position) of the random variable in the family
does not change the joint distribution. From (36) we also have that, for any
measurable operator O,
L
(
x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n), O(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δx(i))
)
= L
(
xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n), O(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δx(i))
)
, (37)
where we do not permute the last component.
For indistinguishable random variables/ processes, the convergence of the
empirical measure mn :=
1
n
∑n
i=1 δx(i) has been widely studied. This sits at
the intersection between group theory and probability theory. The symmetry
group properties have been used to derive some properties of the distributions
of the processes. The de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage theory provides the mean-field
convergence of such a measure-valued process. When studying convergence of
measures, an important issue is the choice of probability metric. In order to
measure the gap between two probability measures, we introduce the Wasser-
stein (Vasershtein) metric (also called Monge-Kantorovich metric) dα of order
α ≥ 1.
Definition 4 (Wasserstein).
dαα(µ, ν) = inf
{∫
(x,y)
d0(x, y)
αγ(dx, dy);
γ ∈ P(X × X ), γx = µ, γy = ν} ,
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where γx denotes the marginal with the respect to the x−component, where d0
is a reference metric on X (such a metric exists because X is assumed to be
metrizable).
The famous Kantorovich-Rubinstein 1958 theorem gives a dual representa-
tion of d1 in terms of a Lipschitz-Bounded metric:
d(µ, ν) := d1(µ, ν) = sup
{∫
φd(µ − ν); ‖φ‖Lip ≤ 1
}
,
where ‖φ‖Lip = ‖φ‖∞ + supx 6=y |φ(x)−φ(y)|d0(x,y) is the Lipschitz-norm of φ. It can
be shown that dα is a metric (a ”true” distance in a topological sense), i.e., it
satisfies the axioms of a metric. For Polish spaces X , the Wasserstein distance
d1 is known to metrize the weak topology over X . As stated in Villani’s book
[35] the Wasserstein distance has the following properties: for any 1 ≤ α < +∞,
lim
n
dα(mn,m) = 0
implies, in particular, that
• mn converges to m in distribution (weak convergence of probability mea-
sures) i.e.,
Emn [φ] :=
∫
φdmn → Em[φ],
as n→ +∞, for any measurable bounded and Lipschitz functions φ.
• ∫ dα0 (x, y)mn(dy) < +∞ for some x ∈ X .
Thanks to these nice properties, the Wasserstein distance dα is an appropri-
ate candidate for the convergence of the empirical measure in the weak sense.
Theorem 1 (de Finetti-Hewitt-Savage). Let x(1), x(2), . . . , be an indistinguish-
able sequence of X−valued random variables, where X is a Polish space. Then,
there is a P(X )−valued random measure m such that
m = lim
m→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
δx(i) , almost surely,
where P(X ) denotes the space of probability measures on X . Conditioned on m,
the random variables x(1), x(2), . . . are i.i.d with distribution m, that is, for each
measurable bounded function φ,
E
(
φ(x(1), x(2), . . . , x(k)) | m
)
=
∫
φ(y1, . . . , yk)m(dy1) . . .m(dyk).
In addition, if the moments of x(i) are finite then
d1
(
m,
1
n
n∑
i=1
δx(i)
)
≤ C1√
n
= O
(
1√
n
)
,
where C1 > 0 and d = d1 denotes the Wasserstein metric of order one.
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Note that the convergence in Theorem 1 is in the weak sense since the Monge-
Kantorovich distance d1 metrizes the weak topology. Theorem 1 has been proved
by de Finetti (1931, [31]) for infinite binary sequences and has been extended
by Hewitt and Savage (1955, [32]) to continuous and compact state spaces. A
simple and elegant proof can be found in Aldous (1985, [29]), pp. 18-22, for the
general state space. The rate of convergence for Monge-Kantorovich distance is
obtained following the line of the law of large numbers of interacting systems.
Theorem 1 was initially used for static (time-independent) maps. Then, several
applications in mathematical physics and biology, with dynamical models came
into the picture. These are dynamically interacting particles, genes, molecules
or nodes. Theorem 1 was then extended to the dynamical case in at least two
ways: (i) path wise (up to a certain time step T ), (ii) at each time step t.
A.2 Large Deviation Principle for m
n
We say that for any time t, the probability measures (mn(t))n≥0 on a topological
space obeys a Large Deviation Principle with rate functions (I(t, .)) and in the
scale (an)n if (an)n is a real-valued sequence satisfying an → ∞ and I is a
non-negative, lower semicontinuous function such that
− inf
x∈int(B)
I(t, x) ≤ lim inf
n
1
an
logmn(t, B)
≤ lim sup
n
1
an
logmn(t, B) ≤ − inf
x∈cl(B)
I(t, x),
for any measurable set B, whose interior is denoted by int(B) and closure by
cl(B). If the level sets {x : I(t, x) ≤ β} are compact for every β < +∞, I(t, .) is
called a good rate function. We introduce H˜(.|.) as the relative entropy function
(defined also above)
H˜(µ| ν) :=
∫
log(
dµ
dν
) dµ,
if µ is absolutely continuous with the respect to ν and +∞ otherwise.
The main advantage of having this type of result is the decay of mn(t, B)
as n gets large. Basically, when the two limits are identical, mn(t, B) is the
order of e−anR where R = infx∈B I(t, x) > 0. As a consequence, the weak
convergence from Theorem 1 and central limit theorems can be derived from
these inequalities.
The next result provides a large deviation principle result [35].
Theorem 2. Assume that initially mn(0) follows a large deviation principle
with rate I(0,m(0)) on the set of probability measures P(X ). Then (mn(t, .))t∈[0,T ]
follows a large deviation principle on the set of cadlag functions from [0, T ] to
P(X ) with good rate
I(t,m(t)) ={
I(0,m(0)) +
∫ 1
0
H˜( m˙(s) | m(0)) if m˙(s) a.c.
+∞ otherwise
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where a.c. means absolutely continuous.
Definition 5. Consider two processes (x(t))t∈[0,T ] and (y(t))t∈[0,T ] and set
DT,α(µ, ν) := inf


(
E[ sup
t∈[0,T ]
d0(x(t), y(t))
α]
)1/α
;
L(x) = µ, L(y) = ν} .
We now prove Theorem 1 in several steps:
A.3 Existence of solution to the state equation
We start with the existence of solution. To prove existence of a solution with the
respect to the Wasserstein distance, we adopt a contraction-type of approach.
Then, we construct a Cauchy sequence (Lα space which is a Polish space).
Consequently, the solution is almost unique. Consider the SDE given by
x(t) = x(0) +
∫ t
0
σ(., s, x(s))dB(s)+
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x(s), y, u)m(s, dy)
]1/α
ds =: RH(x)[m].
Then one gets a fixed-point stochastic equation inm: m = L(x(t)) = L(RH(x)[m]).
Consider two measures m1(s, dy) and m2(s, dy) such that DT,α(mi,m0) <
+∞ then
Dt,α (L(RH(x)[m1]),L(RH(x)[m2]))
≤ 2Le2Lt
∫ t
0
Ds,α(m1,m2) ds,
for any t ∈ [0, T ]. Let c > 0, Ψ(f)(t) ≤ c ∫ t0 f(s) ds, t ∈ [0, T ] for some operator
Ψ. and M = sups∈[0,T ] f(s).
Ψ2(f)(t) ≤ c
∫ t
0
Φ(f)(s) ds = c
∫ t
0
[cMs] ds = c2
t2
2
M.
Then, by induction, Φk(f)(t) ≤
(
ck T
k
k!
)
M, and
Dt,α
(Lk+1(µ0),Lk(µ0)) ≤ CkT T kk! DT,α (L(µ0), µ0) < +∞,
where CT = 2Le
2LT , and where we have used the Lipschitz continuity L of b
and the Minkowski inequality for p ≥ 1. By summing up over natural numbers
k, one gets
∑
k≥k0
Dt,α
(Lk+1(µ0),Lk(µ0)) < +∞. Thus, (Lk(µ0))k≥k0 , is a
Cauchy sequence with the respect to the metric DT,α, for k0 ≥ 1. Since we are
in a complete metric space, this sequence converges to some fixed-point (say,
m). Then m = L(RH(x)[m]) = L(m) is the unique fixed-point, solution of the
SDE.
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A.4 Pathwise mean-field convergence
Consider n independent random process x∗i,n satisfying
x∗i,n(t) = x
∗
i,n(0) +
∫ t
0
σ(., s, x∗i,n(s))dB(s)
+
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)m∗(s, dy)
]1/α
ds,
m∗(t, .) = L(x∗(t)). and the particle representation
xi,n(t) = xi,n(0) +
∫ t
0
σ(., s, xi,n(s))dB(s)
+
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, xi,n(s), y, u)mn(s, dy)
]1/α
ds,
where m∗n(t, .) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 δx∗i,n(t).
It suffices to prove the statement for the coefficient with mean-field term.
We take the difference between the two drift terms.
D =
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)m∗(s, dy)
]1/α
ds (38)
−
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, xi,n(s), y, u)mn(s, dy)
]1/α
ds (39)
We decompose D into three separate terms as follows:
D =
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)m∗(s, dy)
]1/α
ds
−
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)m∗n(s, dy)
]1/α
ds (40)
+
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)m∗n(s, dy)
]1/α
ds
−
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)mn(s, dy)
]1/α
ds (41)
+
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)mn(s, dy)
]1/α
ds
−
∫ t
0
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, xi,n(s), y, u)mn(s, dy)
]1/α
ds (42)
D = I1 + I2 + I3 (43)
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The first term I1 (see (40)) deals only with i.i.d random variables. Therefore,
the convergence for that part is classical. For the second term I2, we use the
triangular inequality for α ≥ 1. By Lipschitz continuity of b , we get |I2| ≤
L
n
1
α
∫ t
0
[∑n
i=1 ‖x∗i,n(s)− xi,n(s)|‖α
]1/α
ds. By Lipschitz continuity of b, |I3| ≤∫ t
0 |x∗i,n(s‘)− xi,n(s)| ds.
By Ho¨lder inequality
{
E[ sup
s∈[0,T ]
|x∗i,n(s)− xi,n(s)|α]
}1/α
(44)
≤
∫ T
0
{E‖Yn,s‖α}1/α ds
+
L
n
1
α
∫ T
0

E sup ‖ n∑
j=1
|x∗j,n(s)− xj,n(s)|‖α


1/α
ds
+L
∫ T
0
{E[ sup
s∈[0,t]
|x∗i,n(s)− xi,n(s)|α]}1/α dt
where
Yn,s =
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)m∗(s, dy)
]1/α
−
[∫
y
|b|α(., s, x∗i,n(s), y, u)m∗n(s, dy)
]1/α
(45)
Summing over i and using Gronwall Lemma yields
{E[ sup
s∈[0,T ]
|x∗i,n(s)− xi,n(s)|α]}1/α
≤ 2Le2LT
∫ T
0
{E‖Yn,s‖α}1/α ds.
which provides a convergence rate of
√
n since
sup
n
√
n
{
E sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖Yn,s‖α
}1/α
< +∞.
This result shows that when α ≥ 1, and when the initial distributions of the
virtual particles are mutually independent, with same distribution as x(0), then
the particle interaction model with fixed control u soon destroys that indepen-
dence through the empirical measuremn. But, for a given finite time t, when the
number of particle becomes large, the mean-field convergence implies that the
distributions become approximately independent again conditioning on m(t, .),
so that independence is still retained. This is called propagation-of-chaos. Note
35
that this result is limited to finite horizon. For long-term behavior one needs to
study the asymptotics (infinite horizon in time) of the SDEs in order to derive
propagation (or non-propagation) of chaos property.
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